they contributed to the confinement of the existing NGOs, which had gained legitimacy in opposing the war and the illiberal regimes, to a reduced and marginal role in the post-war period, rather than encouraging its early transformation into a successful, positive and legitimate interface facilitating, from the very beginning, interactions between the state and the society as a central issue of good governance and reconstruction. This transformation was all the more necessary given that civil society was itself facing transition. NGOs had to shift their wartime activities to peacetime programmes. Their early inclusion would certainly have facilitated more inclusive projects on their part, and therefore encouraged the emergence in the Western Balkans of a more diversified and powerful civil society engaged not only in transitional justice or human rights activities but also focused on empowering citizens to use the democratic tools to provoke societal and political changes. Instead, after more than a decade of transition, state institutions, political parties and traditional civil society actors like labour unions, professional organisations, religious organisations and war veterans' unions remained mostly fragmented and organised along ethno-political lines in the whole region.
Peace-building requires working concomitantly from the bottom-up, the top-down and the middle-out. Therefore a transformation from a civil society dominated by anti-war intellectuals to a more inclusive civil society would have strengthened its capacity to (1) provide a basis for a social consensus upon which political, economic and societal reforms can be based and (2) influence an overall transition mostly outside driven and characterised by a 'liberalisation before democratisation' strategy that has produced social frustrations among citizens left with no palpable democratic compensations.
State-building, peace-building and building civil society are indubitably intermeshed and parallel processes that cannot be undertaken separately or sequentially. The same applies when it comes to assessing their influence on war-to-peace transition. In many instances, civil society in the Western Balkans was expected to function as substitute for usually state-run activities and to redress the failure of both the states and the international actors over a process in which it was mostly excluded, being perceived as a valuable partner only after it appears that the transition was partially unsuccessful. As a result, the civil society was confined, and indeed confined itself, mostly to specific 'substitution' tasks and hence created isolated pockets of activities.
In the absence of political will to address the war crimes legacy, many of the most crucial tasks of any war-to-peace transformation of
